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THE INFLATION TAX, VARIABLE
TIME PREFERENCE, AND THE
BUSINESS CYCLE
RADHIKA LAHIRI
Queensland University of Technology
This paper investigates the impact of anticipated inflation on features of the business cycle
in the presence of recursive but intertemporally dependent tastes. Intertemporal
dependence is induced by the presence of a variable or endogenous individual rate of time
preference. Quantitative experiments indicate that variability in the rate of time preference
can enhance the contribution of monetary shocks to the fluctuations of real variables.
Another implication of the variable-time-preference model is that, unlike the fixed time
preference model, the business cycle features in high inflation and low inflation
economies can be very different. The contribution of monetary shocks to fluctuations
increases partly because endogenous time preference accentuates inflation-tax effects,
which are already present in the standard framework because of the presence of
cash-in-advance constraints. The change in the relative role of monetary shocks is also
related to how variable time preference alters the effects of technology shocks, which can
be quantitatively or qualitatively different in comparison to the standard model, depending
on the parameters of the model.
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1. INTRODUCTION
There are several discussions of the monetary nonneutralities that arise in neo-
classical growth models with money introduced via cash-in-advance constraints
on the purchases of consumption goods, and sometimes on the purchases of labor
and capital. The prediction of these models, that money growth and output are
negatively correlated in the long run, has considerable empirical support. See, for
example, Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Summers and Heston (1991), Levine and
Renelt (1992), Fischer (1993), and Barro (1995). The mechanism that leads to a
negative correlation between money growth and output in cash-in-advance models
is typically described as follows: Anticipated monetary shocks cause substitution
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out of goods subject to the cash constraint toward noncash goods such as leisure.
Consequently, there is a decline in output. Such anticipated inflation or inflation
tax effects have been discussed extensively by Stockman (1981), Greenwood and
Huffman (1987), Cooley and Hansen (1989, 1991, 1992) among others.
The role of anticipated inflation or inflation tax effects in generating monetary
nonneutralities in neoclassical growth models with cash-in-advance constraints
has been assessed in many different ways. In addition to studies that confine their
attention to the effects of inflation/money growth on the deterministic stationary
state of the economy, there are also analyses of nonneutralities on the transition
path to the steady state, such as that of Abel (1985). More recently, economists have
assessed the quantitative significance of inflation-tax effects by examining whether
these effects lead to a larger contribution of monetary shocks to the fluctuations of
real variables. In one of the first papers in the tradition of equilibrium business cycle
models with money, Cooley and Hansen (1989) address this issue by comparing the
cyclical properties of a benchmark real-business-cycle model with that of the model
modified to incorporate money via a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption
purchases. They conclude that the contribution of monetary shocks to fluctuations
of real variables is insignificant relative to technology shocks.
This paper is another exploration of monetary nonneutralities arising due to the
inflation-tax effects of money growth. The model of this paper extends that of
Cooley and Hansen (1989) by introducing variability in the representative agent’s
rate of time preference. Specifically, the discount factor applied to future utility is
decreasing in contemporaneous utility, reflecting an increase in the agent’s impa-
tience as he or she feels better off. Preferences, which are still recursive but not
time additive, are formulated according to Epstein’s (1983) concept of stationary
cardinal utility. Epstein postulates conditions under which such preferences are
consistent with expected utility, and conditions that ensure the dynamic stability
of models that incorporate such preferences.
An extension of the standard cash-in-advance framework to allow for variable
or endogenous time preference has several motivations. One motivation, which
would be applicable to similar extensions of any dynamic general equilibrium
framework, is obvious. The flexible-time-preference framework is a more general
one, and nests the fixed-discount-factor framework as a special case. It is therefore
desirable to check whether conclusions of standard frameworks are robust to this
generalization. In the context of monetary dynamic general equilibrium models of
the type studied in this paper, we are interested in whether the percentage contri-
bution of monetary shocks to the volatility of output is enhanced or diminished by
incorporating variable time preference. Other issues of interest are the implications
of endogenous time preference for the long run effects of money growth, and for
the transition dynamics of real variables following a money growth shock. A priori,
it is reasonable to expect that monetary nonneutralities will be enhanced in the
variable-time-preference framework. Loosely speaking, the underlying intuition
is as follows: In an environment in which monetary injections and real activity are
negatively correlated due to the presence of inflation-tax effects, the utility decline
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associated with the money shock is followed by an increase in the discount fac-
tor. This would make individuals more patient, and consequently more tolerant of
sacrifices in current consumption benefits, producing a larger negative correlation
between money growth and real activity.
To address these issues, we calibrate the model economy to match second mo-
ment properties of postwar U.S. data. Volatility of real output in the model with
the variance of the technology shock approximately set to zero is computed. This
volatility, expressed as a percentage of the output volatility in the model with both
money and technology shocks, is a measure of the contribution of monetary shocks
to the fluctuations in output. It turns out that the assumption of endogenous time
preference can enhance this contribution considerably, although it remains much
smaller than that of technology shocks. Furthermore, increasing the mean growth
rate of monetary shocks (where monetary shocks are assumed to follow an au-
toregressive process), affects the cyclical features of the variable-time-preference
economy. This stands in sharp contrast to the fixed time preference framework, in
which cyclical features are unaffected by an increase in the average growth rate of
money.
To understand the mechanisms that alter the relative role of monetary shocks in
the variable-discount-factor economy, we conduct some additional experiments.
Exploring these mechanisms requires that we look at the responses of variables
to both monetary and technology shocks, and how these responses change as we
change the degree of variability in the rate of time preference. Some interesting
qualitative and quantitative differences emerge in the more general framework.
Two factors appear to be responsible for altering the relative contribution of mon-
etary shocks in fluctuations of variables. First, in the case of monetary shocks,
inflation-tax effects on the transition path to the steady state are accentuated in
the presence of endogenous time preference. Second, in the case of technology
shocks, endogeneity in the rate of time preference seems to have the effect of
enhancing the income effects of technology shocks. For a range of parameters,
these income effects tend to cancel out the substitution effects of technology
shocks, thus diminishing their contribution to the fluctuations in variables. In
fact, for a sufficiently high degree of variability in the rate of time preference,
the dynamic responses of variables to productivity shocks can be somewhat para-
doxical, since the income effects of the shock tend to dominate the substitution
effects. The assumption of subjective discount factors then imposes some con-
straints on the values of some of the preference parameters at which the model
is calibrated. However, the conclusions regarding the role of monetary shocks
still go through for the set of parameters that are acceptable from this point of
view. Specifically, even if we restrict the parameters to allow for a very small
degree of variability in the rate of time preference, the contribution of monetary
shocks is enhanced without diminishing the model’s ability to mimic features of the
data.
Section 2 presents some further motivation for incorporating endogenous time
preference and reviews some of the related literature. Section 3 presents the
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economic environment. Section 4 analyzes the steady state of the variable-time-
preference model and compares it with that of the fixed time preference model.
The analysis in this section provides a backdrop to the analysis of quantitative
experiments presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Although incorporating endogenous time preference to any framework is an ex-
ercise of interest as a sensitivity check, it is not intended merely for that purpose.
Insight into several unresolved issues is likely to emerge. To elaborate on this
point, endogenous-time-preference models have the appealing feature that they al-
low for intertemporal dependence in tastes by relaxing the restrictive assumption of
time additively separable preferences. Specifically, in this framework, increases in
current consumption lead to declines in the subjective weights assigned to future
consumption benefits. As a result, this assumption typically has had interesting
implications in equilibrium models: it changes the implications of fiscal policy in
Dolmas and Wynne (1998) and enhances the ability of the small open economy
model of Mendoza (1991) to match features of international business cycles.
There are also other extensions, somewhat similar in spirit to the endogenous-
time-preference assumption, that involve invoking some form of intertemporal
dependence in tastes to explain a diverse set of phenomena. In Becker and Murphy
(1988), for example, period utility is postulated to depend on some measure of past
consumption, in addition to current consumption, so that addictive behavior may
be consistent with utility maximization by rational consumers. On the other hand,
the business cycle model of Kydland and Prescott (1982) assumes current utility to
be affected by past leisure choices, in order to generate more realistic labor-market
fluctuations. Constantinides (1990) uses habit formation in consumption to explain
high excess returns to equities observed in U.S. data.
Some researchers also make an empirical case for abandoning the assumption
of intertemporal independence in preferences. Tests of Euler equations arising
from standard time additive fixed-discount-factor representations generally have
led to strong statistical rejections. In addition, certain implications of time additive
preferences are inconsistent with cross-sectional behavior of consumption and
income growth. Some of this literature is briefly surveyed by Obstfeld (1990).
There is also direct empirical evidence of variability in rates of time preference,
such as that of Lawrance (1991), though its implications for endogeneity in rates
of time preference are not obvious.
To be more specific, Lawrance uses PSID data to compute rates of time prefer-
ence of different labor income groups. She finds that rates of time preference are
higher among groups with low levels of labor income. This evidence cannot, how-
ever, be interpreted as conflicting with the assumption that the discount factor is
decreasing in utility (or that the rate of time preference is increasing in utility). In
Lawrance’s work, rates of time preference are identified using Euler equations
of fixed-discount-factor environments. Furthermore, as the dynamic responses
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(to monetary shocks) analyzed later in this paper illustrate, a positive correla-
tion with the discount factor and real wages is possible even though the underlying
assumption is that the discount factor is decreasing in utility.
There is also some disagreement among economists regarding the intuitive plau-
sibility of this assumption. Friedman (1969), for example, does not believe that the
rate of time preference can be systematically related to the level of consumption
along a constant consumption path.1 As a critique of the Friedman rule, which
is stated as an equality between a specific rate of deflation and a constant rate of
time preference, Stein (1970) points out that it is not possible to infer a constant
optimal rate of monetary expansion by looking at historical data. This is because
the rate of discount is an unknown that depends on socioeconomic factors, and
changes over time. Stein suggests that time preference should decrease over time
as the representative agent’s utility increases. This is also the view of Fisher (1930)
who discusses various factors on which the rate of time preference may or may
not depend, and postulates that time preference or “impatience” is associated with
lower levels of real income and, consequently, utility.
The assumption that the rate of time preference decreases as utility increases
would be implied by the assumption that the discount factor, β(.), is increasing in
utility. As mentioned earlier, this is contrary to what is assumed in this paper and
in other general equilibrium models that assume an endogenous time preference
structure. Although this assumption may seem difficult to defend a priori, it is
a necessary condition for the dynamic stability of these models. Furthermore, it
is useful in eliminating some innately implausible implications of the fixed time
preference assumption.
The assumption that β ′(u) < 0, often referred to as the increasing marginal
impatience assumption, is thus imposed in works that theoretically analyze optimal
growth economies with recursive but not time additive preferences. [See, e.g.,
Uzawa (1968), Epstein (1983, 1987), and Lucas and Stokey (1984)]. Lucas and
Stokey (1984) provide an example illustrating the stark theoretical predictions
arising in fixed-discount-factor environments. In an economy in which consumers
have different but fixed discount factors, all of the economy’s long run wealth
ends up with the most patient consumer. So that a nondegenerate steady state
emerges for the economy, the discount factor must be decreasing in utility.2 It
is also quite natural, by similar analogy, to argue that the increasing marginal
impatience assumption be imposed in small open economy models, so that the
economy’s long run debt position is well defined. Not surprisingly, we find that
this assumption is imposed in the heterogeneous-agent equilibrium models, such
as that of Gomme and Greenwood (1995), and open economy equilibrium models,
such as that of Mendoza (1991).
Finally, Epstein (1987) provides two additional arguments in favor of the as-
sumption β ′(.) < 0. Loosely speaking, one of the arguments runs as follows: Since
an increase in aggregate future utility may imply an increase in future consumption,
it is reasonable to assume that present consumption will be given more weight in the
event aggregate future utility increases. In other words, the rate of time preference
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increases with an increase in future utility. Increasing marginal impatience is in
turn implied by the above hypothesis. Another argument is that the assumption of
increasing marginal impatience “is equivalent to the implied preference ordering
over random consumption paths exhibiting an aversion to correlation in the con-
sumption levels in any two periods.” To the extent that this aversion is intuitively
plausible, it provides additional support for the increasing marginal impatience
assumption.
3. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
The economy described below is a version of the monetary business cycle model
of Cooley and Hansen (1989), with endogenous time preference introduced via a
discount factor that depends on utility. There is a continuum of identical infinitely
lived households, with preferences formulated in accordance with Epstein’s (1983)
notion of stationary cardinal utility. The representative household in this economy
therefore desires to maximize expected lifetime utility given by
E
{ ∞∑
t=0
[
t−1∏
τ=0
β(u(cτ , 1 − hτ ))
]
u(ct , 1 − ht )
}
, (1)
where β(u(ct , 1 − ht )) must be of the form e−φ(u(ct ,1−ht )) and u(ct , 1 − ht ) repre-
sents the household’s period-t momentary utility, defined over consumption ct and
leisure 1 − ht . The function u must be negative, strictly increasing with ln(−u)
convex in the composite consumption-leisure good. It is also required that φ be pos-
itive, increasing, strictly concave and that u′eφ(u) be nonincreasing.3 The endoge-
nous discount factor attached to u(ct , 1 − ht ) (i.e., the term
∏t−1
τ=0 e
−φ(u(cτ ,1−hτ))),
incorporates an impatience effect: An increase in current-period utility causes the
household to discount future periods more heavily.
The functional forms for the period utility and discount functions are described
as follows:
u(ct , 1 − ht ) = c
1−σ
t − 1
1 − σ − Bht , (2)
β(u(ct , 1 − ht )) = e−(η+τu), 0 < τ < 1, (3)
where the specification for the momentary utility function is consistent with the
“indivisible labor” assumption and nests the Cooley and Hansen (1989) log utility
specification as the case in which σ = 1.
Households enter period t with nominal money balances mt−1 carried over from
the previous period. The government augments these money balances with a lump-
sum transfer equal to the increase in money supply, where the aggregate money
supply Mt is determined according the following rule4:
Mt = gt Mt−1. (4)
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Thus the total amount of money balances held by a household at the beginning of
period t is the amount
mt−1 + (gt − 1)Mt−1. (5)
There is a cash-in-advance constraint on the purchase of the nonstorable consump-
tion good, which ensures that money will be valued in equilibrium. Expenditure
on the consumption good, therefore cannot exceed the total money balances avail-
able to the household; that is,
pt ct ≤ mt−1 + (gt − 1)Mt−1. (6)
The growth rate of money, gt , evolves according to
log(gt+1) = α log(gt ) + ξt+1, (7)
where ξt+1 is i.i.d normal with mean (1 − α)log(g¯) and variance σ 2ξ , and log(g¯)
represents the unconditional mean of log(gt ).
The representative firm in the economy hires labor and capital from the house-
holds to produce a composite consumption-investment good. There is a standard
neoclassical aggregate production function of the Cobb–Douglas form, which com-
bines capital (Kt ) and labor input (Ht ) to yield output (Yt ):
Yt = ezt K θt H 1−θt , (8)
where θ is the factor income share of capital and ezt represents a shock to technol-
ogy in period t . The random variable zt follows the process
zt+1 = γ zt + εt+1, (9)
where εt+1 is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and variance σ 2ε .
The competitive firm maximizes profit, which is given by Yt − wt Ht − rt Kt .
The variables wt and rt represent the wage and rental rates paid for the use of labor
and capital services of the households. The first-order conditions for the firm’s
profit maximization problem imply that wt and rt are given by
wt = (1 − θ)ezt K θt H−θt ; (10)
rt = θezt K θ−1t H 1−θt . (11)
In every period t , household expenditures consist of consumption (ct ), invest-
ment (it ), and the amount of money balances (mt/pt ) that are to be carried over
to the next period. These expenditures must not exceed total household income,
which is the sum of income earned from labor and capital services, money balances
carried over from the previous period, and the lump-sum monetary transfer from
the government. Households therefore maximize expected lifetime utility subject
to (6) and a sequence of budget constraints of the following form:
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ct + xt + mtpt ≤ w(zt , Kt , Ht )ht + r(zt , Kt , Ht )kt +
mt−1 + (gt − 1)Mt−1
pt
,
(12)
where household investment expenditure in period t is given by
xt = kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt . (13)
In equation (13), kt is the household’s capital stock in period t , and δ is the rate at
which the capital stock depreciates.
For a value of g greater than 1, both Mt and pt will grow without bound. To make
the household’s problem stationary, some of the variables need to be transformed.
To that end, we define mˆt = mt/Mt and pˆt = pt/Mt . Furthermore, stationary car-
dinal utility permits a recursive formulation of the household’s problem described
above. The problem, then, can be restated as
V (zt , gt , mˆt−1, kt , Kt ) = max
ct ,ht ,mˆt ,kt+1
{u(ct , 1 − ht ) + β(u(ct , 1 − ht ))
× Et [V (zt+1, gt+1, mˆt , kt+1, Kt+1)/zt , gt , mˆt−1kt , Kt ]}, (14)
subject to
ct +kt+1 − (1−δ)kt + mˆtpˆt = w(zt , Kt , Ht )ht + r(zt , Kt , Ht )kt +
gt − 1 + mˆt−1
gt pˆt
,
(15)
and
ct = gt − 1 + mˆt−1gt pˆt . (16)
In addition, the representative household’s decisions must be consistent with the
laws of motion for the aggregate state variables, given by
Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + Xt , (17)
zt+1 = γ zt + εt+1, (18)
log(gt+1) = α log(gt ) + ξt+1, (19)
as well as the economywide aggregate decision rules perceived by the households:
Ht = H(zt , gt , Kt ),
Xt = X (zt , gt , Kt ), and
ˆPt = ˆPt (zt , gt , Kt ). (20)
In equilibrium, aggregate per capita quantities turn out to be equal to the choices of
the representative household. In particular, it must be the case that ht = Ht , kt = Kt ,
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xt = Xt , and mˆt−1 = mˆt = 1. Since the cash-in-advance constraint is assumed to
be binding in equilibrium, we also have ct = 1/ ˆPt .
4. ANALYSIS OF THE STEADY STATE
A comparison of the deterministic steady states of the benchmark fixed-discount-
factor model, and the model with endogenous time preference clarifies the intuition
underlying the differences between the two models. Consider first the model in
which the discount factor, and hence the rate of time preference, is fixed. The
household’s problem in this case is the same as (14), with β(u(ct , 1 − ht )) replaced
by a fixed discount factor β. After eliminating ct and ht using the constraints (15)
and (16), the Euler equation with respect to mˆt is
βEt
u1(ct+1, 1 − ht+1)
gt + 1 pˆt+1
= u2(ct , 1 − ht )
pˆtw(zt , Kt , Ht )
. (21)
Substituting for pˆt = pt/Mt , equation (21) can be written as
βEt
u1(ct+1, 1 − ht+1)
πt+1
= u2(ct , 1 − ht )
w(zt , Kt , Ht )
, (21′)
where πt+1 = pt+1/pt . The equation above illustrates the inefficiency imposed
due to the presence of money in this economy. The presence of inflation clearly
distorts the agent’s consumption–leisure decision—higher inflation implies a lower
equilibrium marginal utility of leisure in period t per unit real wages relative to
the expected marginal utility from period t + 1 consumption. In other words, it is
now optimal for the agent to have a lower level of period t + 1 consumption, and
a higher level of leisure than in an economy in which there is no money, or the
cash-in-advance constraint is not binding.
In the steady state of this economy, the above condition is equivalent to the
following:
βu1(c, 1 − h)
u2(c, 1 − h) =
g
w(z, K , H)
. (22)
Equation (22) looks very similar to a labor market-clearing condition, although
the underlying condition from which it is derived is an intertemporal, not and
intratemporal, efficiency condition. It is, however, clear from (22) that a higher
growth rate of money implies a higher marginal utility of consumption relative
to marginal utility of leisure per unit wage rate in the steady state, which in turn
indicates a lower steady state level of consumption and hours. This is the standard
outcome of a cash-in-advance model in which agents, in the face of inflation,
substitute consumption of the cash good, which is subject to an inflation tax, for
leisure, which is not. This model thus implies that high inflation rates are associated
with low employment, a result that supports Friedman’s (1977) conjecture of an
upward-sloping Phillips curve.
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Similarly, the Euler equation for capital is given by
βEt [r(zt+1, Kt+1, Ht+1) + 1 − δ] = u2(ct , 1 − ht )w(zt+1, Kt+1, Ht+1)
u2(ct+1, 1 − ht+1)w(zt , Kt , Ht ) .
The equation above equates the discounted expected return from capital to the
marginal rate of substitution between current and future leisure times the ratio of
future to current wages. From (21′), it is clear that in a monetary economy the
expected rate of return to capital will be positively related to πt+2/πt+1, on the
transition path toward the economy’s steady state. In the nonstochastic steady state,
however,
r(z, K , H) − δ = 1
β
− 1. (23)
Equation (23) equates the steady state real interest, adjusted for depreciation, to
the fixed rate of time preference. Under the assumption of constant returns to scale,
r and w can be written in the form
f ′(κ) = r, (24)
f (κ) − κ f ′(κ) = w, (25)
where κ is the capital/labor ratio and f (κ) is the production function expressed in
per capita terms. Since the capital/labor ratio is determined from (23), it is clear
from (23), (24), and (25) that κ, r , and w are unaffected by the growth rate of
money.5 However, for a given capital/labor ratio, lower steady state hours imply
a lower capital stock. In a version of this model with inelastic labor, of course,
money growth would have no effect on the long run capital stock.
Now, consider the model with an endogenous discount factor. The corresponding
Euler equations for this case are given by
β(u(ct , 1 − ht ))Et u1(ct+1, 1 − ht+1)pˆt+1gt+1 [1 + β
′(u(ct+1, 1 − ht+1)) Et+1V (t + 2)]
= u2(ct , 1 − ht )
pˆtw(t)
[1 + β ′(u(ct , 1 − ht ))Et V (t + 1)], (26)
β(u(ct , 1 − ht ))Et
{
u2(ct+1, 1 − ht+1)
w(t + 1) [r(t + 1) + 1 − δ]
× [1 + β ′(u(ct+1, 1 − ht+1)) Et+1V (t + 2)]
}
= u2(ct , 1 − ht )
w(t)
[1 + β ′(u(ct , 1 − ht ))Et V (t + 1)], (27)
where V( j), w( j), and r( j) are shorthand notation for the period- j value function,
wage, and rental rate, respectively. Note that these conditions nest the fixed discount
506 RADHIKA LAHIRI
factor model as a special case in which β ′(u) = 0. In the nonstochastic steady state,
we have
β(u(c, 1 − h))u1(c, 1 − h)
u2(c, 1 − h) =
g
w(z, K , H)
, (28)
and,
r(z, K , H) − δ = 1
β(u(c, 1 − h)) − 1. (29)
For a given level ofβ(.), an increase in the money growth rate implies that consump-
tion and hours fall, just as in the fixed-discount-factor case. In the endogenous-
time-preference model, however, the fall in consumption causes a decline in utility,
and in the presence of increasing impatience, a rise in the endogenous discount
factor. On the other hand, the decline in hours exerts an opposite influence: the
discount factor will fall as a result of the increase in utility generated by a higher
level of leisure. What, then, is the net effect on β(.)? The answer is clearly sensitive
to the specification of functional forms for u and β(.), but for a reasonably broad
class of specifications, one could expect an increase in the discount factor. It is
then no longer possible to rule out the case in which consumption and hours, and
hence output, are higher compared to the fixed time preference model. Similarly,
lower levels of output, consumption, and hours are also possible.
The increase in money growth will also have a different impact on the capital
market, as described by equation (29). An increase in β(.) indicates a lower real
interest rate, and therefore a higher capital/labor ratio than in the fixed time pref-
erence case, whereas the opposite result obtains in the event of a decrease in β(.).
Consequently, the impact on the capital stock is also ambiguous: the model can
now generate a capital stock that is higher or lower than in the fixed-discount-factor
case, while it is also possible that a positive money growth and capital correlation,
or what is often termed as the Tobin effect, obtains.
It would therefore seem that the assumption of a constant discount factor is
“necessary” to produce a long run decline in consumption, hours worked, capital
stock, and output as a result of an increase in the monetary growth rate. The
more general model with variable time preference, on the other hand, can nest
long run outcomes that have been observed in a wide variety of frameworks in the
money-and-growth literature—viz. Tobin (1965), Sidrauski (1967), and Stockman
(1981).
5. ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE EXPERIMENTS
In this section we analyze the results of several numerical experiments designed to
assess the relative role of monetary shocks in the fixed and flexible discount factor
economies. The artificial economies described above are used to compute second
moment summaries and dynamic responses to monetary growth shocks, using a
numerical approximation of the respective models. The technique used to obtain
this approximation is the method of parameterized expectations, due to Den Haan
and Marcet (1990), and is described in the Appendix.
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To conduct quantitative experiments, values are assigned to the parameters
of preferences and technology, following the convention of choosing parameters
based on observed features of the data. To that end, and to maintain comparability
with the study of Cooley and Hansen (1989), which is the benchmark economy
here, most of the parameters chosen are the same as those used in that paper. In
particular, we set θ = 0.36, B = 2.86, α = 0.48, and γ = 0.95, and σ = 1.6 The
parameter η is set to ensure that the steady state value of the discount function
coincides with the fixed discount factor β, where β = 0.99. We also set the stan-
dard deviations of the technology and money growth shocks equal to 0.00721, and
0.009 respectively, as in Cooley and Hansen (1989).
This leaves us with the question of how to calibrate the additional parameter τ
introduced in the variable-time-preference model. Stability conditions dictate that
we choose a value in the range 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, where τ = 0 corresponds to the special
case of fixed time preference. This is somewhat problematic since the choice of
functional form for β(.) has, so far, been guided strictly by the local stability
conditions described in Section 3. Pending empirical research on this subject, it is
difficult to say whether the specification considered above, or, for that matter, any
value we may choose to assign to the parameter τ , is “reasonable.” The approach
we follow here is to look at a range of values of τ in which the business cycle
features of the endogenous time-preference model provide an acceptable match to
the data, and examine the contribution of monetary shocks in this range. It turns
out that this range is roughly given by values of τ between 0 and 0.026, which
implies a relatively small degree of variability in the rate of time preference. In
what follows, we primarily focus on the cyclical features and dynamic responses
of variables in this range.
Table 1 presents the second moment summaries of the fixed- and variable-time-
preference models. The first panel corresponds to the value of τ = 0, which is
the special case of fixed time preference. The second and third panels represent
the variable-time-preference economies for τ = 0.01 and τ = 0.02, respectively.
Table 2 presents the corresponding second moments of postwar U.S. data, taken
from Cooley and Hansen (1989). In all of the cases presented, cyclical features of
the artificial economies have qualitative properties similar to the data: Investment
and hours fluctuate more than output, while consumption, capital, and productivity
are less volatile compared to output. Consumption, investment, hours, and produc-
tivity are procyclical, and the price level is countercyclical. The capital stock is
weakly correlated with output. Moving from fixed to flexible time preference in-
creases the volatility of consumption and makes it a little more procyclical, which
is a movement away from the data. However, the relative volatility of consumption
improves as we increase τ from 0 to 0.01. Investment volatility declines with in-
creases in τ in this range, but it becomes less procyclical, which is an improvement
in comparison with the fixed-time-preference case. The standard deviation of the
capital stock, its relative volatility, and its correlation with output are also closer to
the data in the flexible-time-preference model. In the case of work effort, there is
an initial improvement in this range, in the sense of reducing its fluctuations, and
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TABLE 2. Quarterly U.S. time series
Standard
deviation
Standard relative to Correlation
Series deviation output with output
Output 1.74 1.00 1.00
Consumption 0.81 0.46 0.65
Investment 8.45 4.85 0.91
Capital stock 0.38 0.22 0.28
Hours 1.41 0.81 0.86
Productivity 0.89 0.51 0.59
Price level (CPI) 1.59 0.91 −0.48
(GNP deflator) 0.98 0.56 −0.53
Source: Cooley and Hansen (1989).
TABLE 3. Percentage contribution of money shocks to fluctuations in the range
τ ∈ [0, 0.026]
τ
0 0.01 0.02 0.026 0.03 0.04 0.05
Output 2.7 2.6 3.3 3.6 4.8 6.6 9.4
Consumption 62.1 58.6 54.0 51.3 49.6 45.5 41.8
Investment 10.1 21.5 24.9 28.1 31.0 42.1 63.6
Capital stock 12.2 13.9 16.1 18.2 20.1 28.0 47.7
Hours 5.1 5.4 5.6 9.9 12.3 24.3 83.0
Productivity 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.0 5.9 5.8
β(.) 0.0 54.2 63.6 66.9 64.8 51.3 36.7
making it a little less procyclical to output. However, the decline in fluctuations
is quite rapid as τ increases; as we see in the case of τ = 0.02, the volatility of
hours is lower than that observed in the data. The standard deviation and relative
volatility of productivity improve, but it becomes more procyclical as τ increases.
On the whole, however, although one cannot claim an unambiguous improvement
of the model’s features in the presence of endogenous time preference, the match
with the data is not a bad one.
Table 3 presents the contribution of monetary shocks to fluctuations in the range
τ ∈ [0, 0.026], in addition to some other values of τ . The percentage contribution of
monetary shocks to the fluctuations in a particular variable is computed as follows:
We simulate the models with the standard deviation of the technology shock set
approximately equal to zero and express the volatilities obtained as a percentage
of the volatilities in the model in which both shocks have the standard volatilities.
We find that, in the range of τ ∈ [0, 0.05], the contribution of monetary shocks
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to fluctuations in output, investment, the capital stock, and work effort increases
very significantly with increases in τ . However, in the range that is interesting
from an empirical point of view, this contribution is still relatively small compared
to that of technology shocks, although it is much larger than in the fixed time
preference case. It is, of course, possible to get a much larger contribution of
monetary shocks for some ranges of values of τ , but the variable-time-preference
model does not provide a good match for the data in those ranges. Although we
do not report business cycle properties in great detail for higher values of τ , a
summary description, presented in Figures 1 and 2, is sufficient to give an idea of
what happens to the cyclical properties of economic aggregates as variability of
time preference increases. In Figures 1 and 2, we are looking at a much larger range
of values of τ , that is, the range of values in τ ∈ [0, 0.4]. Clearly, the implication of
these results is that τ should be calibrated to allow for a relatively small degree of
variability in the rate of time preference. Nevertheless, even for small values of τ
the contribution of monetary shocks is predicted to be higher than that implied by
constant time preference models of the business cycle.
We now examine the factors responsible for increasing the relative contribution
of monetary shocks in the presence of endogenous time preference. Although this
has something to do with the way endogenous time preference affects dynamic
responses to monetary shocks, in what follows we shall see that it has more to do
with the way variables respond to technology shocks in this economy. Figures 3
and 4, respectively, present dynamic responses of variables to temporary monetary
and technology shocks for values of τ equal to 0, 0.01, and 0.02. First, consider
the responses to monetary shocks for the fixed time preference case of τ = 0.
A 1% increase in money growth leads to a decline in consumption work effort
and output, and an increase in the capital stock. The typical interpretation is that
agents substitute out of activities subject to the inflation tax, that is, consumption
and work effort, toward those that are not, such as leisure and, to a lesser extent,
capital accumulation. Lower work effort results in a decline in output. The real
wage rate, or the marginal product of labor increases, as expected, due to the
increase in the capital/labor ratio.
In the case of endogenous time preference, providing an interpretation of this
type becomes a little awkward, because the consumption and leisure decision aff-
ects the discount factor and vice versa. However, the following interpretation may
be considered plausible for the cases presented in Figure 3. The decline associated
with consumption leads to a net decline in utility even though leisure increases,
causing an increase in the discount factor on impact of the monetary shock. The
temporary nature of the shock ensures that this increase in patience toward future
utility is short-lived, and the discount factor goes back to the steady state very
quickly. This means that the representative agent cares a lot about utility in the
period immediately after the shock, but not so much about utility in subsequent
periods. Consequently, investment increases very sharply on impact, and there is
a higher decline in work effort in the second period compared to the fixed time
preference model, reflecting a higher preference for leisure in period 2. The decline
in second-period work effort implies lower output even though the capital stock is
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FIGURE 1. Percentage standard deviations of variables for values of τ in [0, 0.04].
higher relative to steady state. Productivity, as reflected by the real wage rate, is
consequently also higher in the second period following the shock.
These effects, to a lesser extent are also at work in subsequent periods. For
the endogenous time-preference cases presented in Figure 3, one may therefore
conclude that the inflation-tax effects are stronger on the transition path than on
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FIGURE 2. Correlations with output for values of τ in [0, 0.4].
impact. This feature also could be responsible for enhancing the contribution of
monetary shocks to fluctuations in variables. Another interesting characteristic of
the more general model is that the adjustment toward the steady state, of vari-
ables such as output, work effort, and real wages, can be nonmonotonic. This
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FIGURE 3. Dynamic responses to a 1% temporary shock to the monetary growth rate
(α = 0.48): (- - -) τ = 0; (-x-) τ = 0.02; (-o-) τ = 0.01.
is related to the discount factor’s adjustment toward the steady state: The agent
becomes more patient relative to the steady state on impact, but is relatively im-
patient immediately before returning to the steady state level of the time pref-
erence. The variable-time-preference framework is therefore richer in the sense
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FIGURE 4. Dynamic responses to a 1% temporary shock to technology (γ = 0.95): (- - -)
τ = 0; (-x-) τ = 0.02; (-o-) τ = 0.01.
that it has the potential to generate a cyclical pattern of response to exogenous
shocks. One can also view this as another sense in which the contribution of
monetary shocks in fluctuations is greater relative to the fixed time preference
model.
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Next, we consider the responses of variables to technology shocks, which are
presented in Figure 4. In all cases presented, there is a decline in consumption
on impact of the technology shock. Since the shock is temporary, this can be
attributed to consumption smoothing. Also, work effort and investment increase in
order to take advantage of the temporary increase in productivity. Consequently,
output increases on impact, and the capital stock is higher in the next period. In the
variable-time-preference model, quantitative differences emerge because of the
way the discount factor responds to changes in consumption and leisure. Initially,
the decline in leisure and consumption causes the discount factor to increase. This
increase in patience is reflected in a larger decline in consumption and a larger
increase in investment in the first period of the shock. Later, as consumption and
leisure increase, the discount factor declines rapidly, and the agents’ impatience
is reflected in the larger declines observed in work effort, investment, capital,
and output. Put differently, the impatience observed in later periods appears to
enhance the income effects of the technology shocks—people prefer to work less,
leading to larger declines in output, consumption, and investment. This effectively
reduces the persistence of the shock, leading to a somewhat lower contribution to
fluctuations in variables.
Let us now briefly consider what happens in the variable-time-preference econ-
omy beyond the empirically plausible range of τ ∈ [0, 0.026]. An analysis of higher
levels of variability in the discount factor is not the focus of this paper; a summary
description is presented here to provide some further intuition about the mecha-
nisms that make monetary shocks play a more important role in this framework.
The income-impatience effect described earlier is in fact the key to the dramatic
variation in the model’s quantitative properties as τ increases. Initially, in the
empirically plausible range, substitution effects continue to dominate income ef-
fects, but to a lesser extent than in the fixed time preference model. Later, for
an intermediate range of values of τ approximately between 0.026 and 0.06, the
income-impatience effects tend to cancel out substitution effects. Consequently,
the response to the technology shock of variables such as work effort is of a
small magnitude. In this range, therefore, the percentage contribution of mone-
tary shocks is very high. As τ increases further, however, the income-impatience
effects begin to dominate the substitution effects. As a result, technology shocks
become important again, although in a different sense relative to the fixed time
preference economy. For relatively large values of τ , the response to technology
shocks can in fact be quite paradoxical. For example, the income-impatience effect
becomes so large that the response of work effort, and consequently output, is a
highly negative one. This variation of responses to technology shocks is the reason
why second moment features presented in Figures 1 and 2 change so much with
increases in τ .
Another way of examining the role of monetary shocks is to compare the cyclical
features of economies with different average growth rates of money. Tables 4 and
5 present the cyclical properties of the cases τ = 0, τ = 0.026, and τ = 0.05, for
an average growth rate of money g = 1.05 and g = 1.15, respectively. In the case
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of the fixed time preference model, cyclical features are completely invariant to
the changes in the average growth rate of money. In the variable time preference
cases, small changes begin to emerge for the τ = 0.026 case, and these are a little
more pronounced for the τ = 0.05 case, but at the cost of deteriorating cyclical
features. Again, variability in the rate of time preference implies a larger role for
monetary shocks than in the fixed time preference model, but this role remains
much smaller than that of technology shocks. The results in Tables 4 and 5 also
have the interesting implication that cyclical features of high inflation economies
will be somewhat different in comparison with low inflation economies.
On the whole, the analysis here suggests a larger role for money in economic
fluctuations than what is typically predicted by fixed discount factor models. These
results are, of course, subject to the caveat that another free parameter has been
introduced, and the changes in cyclical features of the more general model do
not amount to an unambiguous improvement in terms of matching properties of
the data. However, it is not unreasonable to speculate, on the basis of the results
above, that different functional forms for the discount function could have different
implications for cyclical features and the role of monetary shocks. It is, for example,
conceivable that there exists some combination of discount and utility functions,
that generates a larger role for money and improves the model’s ability to mimic the
data considerably. It is also important to emphasize the exploratory nature of this
study. The objective here has been, in part, to gain some insights by examining
the mechanisms at work in a more general framework, and whether these can
be exploited in improving the empirical performance of standard business cycle
models.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper incorporated an endogenous utility discount factor into an otherwise
standard monetary business cycle model. Quantitative experiments conducted in
this paper seem to imply that conclusions about the nature and extent of monetary
nonneutralities are sensitive to this generalization. In particular, we find that the
presence of variable time preference can lead to a larger percentage contribution
of monetary shocks in the fluctuations of variables. Furthermore, variable rates of
time preference allow this contribution to increase with increases in the average
monetary growth rate. This leads to the interesting prediction that in high infla-
tion economies, money growth will be more important in affecting real economic
fluctuations.
In view of these results, several natural extensions of this study are of inter-
est. The variable time preference framework would, for example, have very dif-
ferent implications for normative issues such as the role of monetary policy. It
would also be interesting to study similar extensions of equilibrium models that
focus on other type of monetary nonneutralities, such as the liquidity-effect mod-
els developed by Lucas (1990) and Fuerst (1992). These issues are explored by
Lahiri (2000).
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NOTES
1. Fisher (1930) defines the rate of time preference as “the (percentage) excess of present marginal
want of one unit of present goods over the present marginal want for one more unit of future goods.”
Variability in this rate would therefore entail variability in rates associated with different levels of
constant consumption streams. The assumption that the rate of time preference is increasing in utility
therefore requires that the individual’s indifference curves between present goods and future goods get
steeper as one moves along a 45-deg line from the origin.
2. Lucas and Stokey (1984) further note that it is not necessary for all consumers to exhibit this
behavior, as long as some consumers are impatient enough to offset the behavior of others. In the context
of representative-agent models, of course, this becomes a necessary condition for the representative
consumer.
3. These restrictions ensure that a stable steady state distribution for the state variables exists and is
unique. Epstein (1983) also shows that, under these conditions, consumption is a normal good in every
period and deviations from the fixed time preference setup are not too great. Although these conditions
are specified for the case in which the utility function has only one argument, viz consumption,
results from Epstein (1983) should go through if consumption and leisure are treated as a composite
commodity. Restrictions specified by Epstein (1983) should then be satisfied with respect to this
composite commodity. [See, e.g., Mendoza (1991) and Gomme and Greenwood (1995)].
4. Uppercase letters denote aggregate economywide per capita variables that an individual house-
hold regards as being outside its sphere of influence; lowercase letters denote variables specific to the
household.
5. It is, of course, possible to generate a positive impact of inflation on the real interest rate by means
of a slight modification of this model. In Stockman (1981), for instance, this is achieved by imposing
a cash-in-advance constraint on investment. In terms of the benchmark model discussed earlier, the
cash-in-advance constraint would look like
ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt = mˆt−1 + gt − 1pˆt gt
Then, instead of equation (25), we would get
r(z, K , H) = [1 − β(1 − δ)]g
β2
,
so that higher inflation is associated with a higher long run interest rate.
6. We choose to approximate the results using σ = 1.001. For the log utility case, the equa-
tions (A.1)–(A.5) in the Appendix become linearly dependent, since in this case equations (A.7)
and (A.9) are identical.
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APPENDIX
Because of the presence of money, equilibrium allocations in this economy are not neces-
sarily Pareto optimal. Consequently, the competitive equilibrium for this economy cannot
be computed indirectly by solving a social planner’s problem. The approach followed here
is essentially a variation of Den Haan and Marcet (1990), which involves a polynomial
approximation of the expectations part of the stochastic Euler equations of the household’s
problem. Before forming this approximation, however, certain market-clearing conditions
need to be imposed. Noting that, in equilibrium, aggregate per capita quantities coincide
with the choices of the representative household, we make the relevant substitutions in the
first-order conditions of the household’s problem. Specifically, we impose ht = Ht , kt = Kt ,
xt = Xt , and mˆt−1 = mˆt = 1. Since the cash-in-advance constraint is assumed to be binding
in equilibrium, we also have ct = Ct = 1/ ˆPt . The economy’s equilibrium characterization
is then given by the following set of equations:
C−σt {1 − Etτβ(u(Ct , 1 − Ht ))V (t + 1)} − λ1t − λ2t = 0, (A.1)
−B{1 − Etτβ(u(Ct , 1 − Ht ))V (t + 1)} + (1 − θ)λ1t eZt K θt H−θt , (A.2)
−λ1t Ct + Etβ(u(Ct , 1 − Ht )) (λ1t+1 + λ2t+1)Ct+1gt+1 = 0, (A.3)
−λ1t + Etβ(u(Ct , 1 − Ht ))
{
θeZt+1 K θ−1t H
1−θ
t + 1 − δ
}
λ1t+1 = 0, (A.4)
Ct + Kt+1 − (1 − δ)Kt = eZt K θt H 1−θt . (A.5)
Here, λ1t and λ2t are the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the household budget and
cash-in-advance constraints, respectively. To solve the model, we need to form an approxi-
mation for the terms involving expectations in equations (A.1), (A.2), (A.3), and (A.4). To
that end, we let the term Etτβ(u(Ct , 1 − Ht ))V (t + 1) be approximated by ψ(z, g, K ; µ),
and the terms Etβ(u(Ct , 1 − Ht )) (λ1t+1 + λ2t+1)Ct+1gt+1 and Etβ(u(Ct , 1 − Ht )){θeZt+1 K θ−1t
H 1−θt + 1 − δ}λ1t+1 by ξ(z, g, K ; ω) and ν(z, g, K ; π), respectively. The functions ψ , ξ ,
and ν are polynomials in z, g, and K , while µ, ω, and π represent the respective vectors
of polynomial coefficients. As is conventional, we choose the degree of the polynomial
by examining how the results change by increasing the degree of the polynomial. That is,
if the solution does not change much between an nth- and (n + 1)th-degree polynomial,
then the nth-degree polynomial is considered a good approximation. It turns out that for the
model in question a second-degree polynomial is a good one. The procedure for forming the
approximation is as follows: Starting with an initial guess for the vectors µ, ω, and π, say
µ0, ω0, and π0, we can solve the first-order conditions above to construct a time series for
consumption, hours, and the capital stock, for a given series of monetary and technology
shocks. Specifically, we can solve for Ct by dividing equation (A.3) by equation (A.4).
Given K0 and z0, we can use (A.2) and (A.4) to solve for Ht , and then use (A.5) to solve
for Kt+1. Once a series has been constructed, it can be used to run three nonlinear least-
squares regressions to estimate a new set of coefficients µ1, ω1, and π1. For example, we
get an estimate for µ1 by running a nonlinear regression of the series τβ(u)V (t + 1) on the
function ψ . [For details on the procedure used for the nonlinear regressions, see Den Haan
and Marcet (1990) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1987).] The next step is to construct a new
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series using a linear combination of the coefficients µ0 and µ1. The new series is used to run
another regression to compute µ2, and so on, until estimates from successive iterations have
converged. However, in this case, we need convergence in all three polynomial coefficients
µ, ω, and π .
